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Case No. 20080979-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
HAROLD EARL BUSHMAN, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for one count of securities fraud, a third 
degree felony, and six counts of attempted securities fraud, all class A 
misdemeanors. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A~4-103(2)(e) 
(West Supp. 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against the imposition in successive 
proceedings of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense. Following 
administrative proceedings on his violations of securities laws, the Utah Division of 
Securities ordered that Defendant cease and desist and imposed a fine. 
Issue: Was the fine a criminal punishment, thus precluding prosecution and 
punishment for the violations in subsequent criminal proceedings? 
Standard of review: " Whether a particular punishment is criminal or civil is, 
at least initially, a matter of statutory construction/' See Hudson v. United States, 522 
U.S. 93, 99 (1997). It is also a "question of constitutional interpretation." State v. 
Arbon, 909 P.2d 1270,1271 (Utah App. 1996). Issues of statutory construction and 
constitutional interpretation are both legal questions, reviewable for correctness. See 
Arbon, 909 P.2d at 1271; see also State v. Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, Tf 7, P.3d . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant statutes are included in the Addendum: 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-20 (West 2004) (Enforcement); 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (West 2004) (Penalties for violations). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with one count of having engaged in a 
pattern of unlawful activity, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-1603 (West 2004); one count of securities fraud, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (West 2004); and ten counts of securities fraud, 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (West 2004). Rl-5. 
Defendant moved to dismiss the case, claiming that the prosecution violated 
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution because the Utah 
Securities Division had previously issued a cease and desist order and an order to 
show cause based on the same conduct and because, in resolving that administrative 
case, Defendant and the Division had entered into a stipulation and consent order 
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requiring Defendant to pay a fine. See Rl03-11. The State opposed, arguing that the 
fine was part of a civil remedy, not a punishment, and that Defendant had not been 
placed in jeopardy during the administrative proceedings that resulted in the fine. 
See R112-18, After hearing argument on the motion, the trial court denied it. See 
R186-87; R232:14-16. 
Defendant then entered a guilty plea, reserving his right to challenge the 
denial of his motion to dismiss, R189-202. Defendant pled guilty to one count of 
securities fraud, a third degree felony, and to six counts of attempted securities 
fraud, all class A misdemeanors. Id. The State dismissed the remaining counts. See 
id. 
On October 20, 2008, the trial court entered judgment, imposing an 
indeterminate prison term of zero to five years on Defendant's conviction for 
securities fraud, but suspending the prison term and imposing a five-day jail term. 
See R210. The court imposed one-year jail terms on Defendant's six convictions for 
attempted securities fraud, to be served consecutively, but suspended all terms. See 
id.} see also R234:9-ll. The court placed Defendant on probation for 204 months and 
imposed a fine of $5000 on Defendant's felony conviction and fines of $2500 on each 
of Defendant's misdemeanor convictions, but apparently suspended all but $1100 in 
fines, including surcharges. R234:9-10; R207-11. 
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On November 20, 2008, Defendant filed both a notice of appeal, R216, and a 
motion to extend for good cause the time for appeal, R217. The trial court granted 
the motion to extend. R220. Defendant's appeal is therefore timely. See Utah R. 
App. P. 4(e) (trial court "may extend time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion 
filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by [rule 4(a), 
i.e., within 30 days after the date of the entry of the judgment]"). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant was charged for conduct involving his solicitation of investments 
and loans from several individuals. 
Dealings with Darold Jensen. In approximately September 2002, Defendant 
met Darold Jensen. R230:5-7. Defendant told Jensen that he had just sold 50,000 
shares of Sun Micro stock for $5.26 a share and would receive the proceeds in about 
two months. R230:6. Defendant asked Jensen for a $30,000 loan, stated he would 
repay him before January 6,2003, and offered to pay 20 percent interest on the loan. 
R230:6-8. The parties signed a written agreement, and Jensen gave Defendant the 
$30,000. R230:8-9 (referencing State's Exhibit 1). Jensen called Defendant 
approximately one year later, asking for his money. R230:9. Five years later, at the 
time of the preliminary hearing, Jensen still had received nothing. R230:9-10. 
Transactions with Jeff Jermaine. In March 2005, Defendant asked Jeff 
Jermaine for a $5000 loan to pay for some family expenses. R230:14. On March 21, 
4 
2005, Defendant gave Jermaine a promissory note, promising to repay the $5000 
loan with 10 percent interest on July 1, 2005. R230:14-15, 19 (referencing State's 
Exhibit 3). Defendant told Jermaine that he was expecting a judgment or settlement 
in a medical malpractice action from which he would make the repayment. R230:15. 
On May 6, 2005, Defendant asked Jermaine for additional funds. R230:15-16. 
Jermaine lent him an addition $1800, to be repaid on May 11, 2005. R230:16-17. 
Defendant paid back the principal on the loans about a year later. R230:18. 
Defendant did not make any interest payments. R230:19. 
Dealings with Randy Porter, On approximately March 7,2006, Randy Porter 
lent Defendant between $250 and $750. R230:21-22. Defendant said he needed the 
money to purchase a gift for his wife. R230:21-22. Defendant repaid this loan on a 
timely basis. R230:22. 
A few weeks later, Defendant called Porter. R230:23. He told Porter that 
Oracle was giving him $80,000 in stock options for his consulting services that year. 
Id. Defendant said that because he was a consultant, he received the options for 
about 15 percent below market value, but could exercise them the same day for a 15 
percent gain. R230:23-24. Defendant said he was "only going to be able to do about 
[$]70,000." R230:24. Defendant told Porter that if he wanted to put in $2500 or 
$3000, Defendant could get him a 15 percent return in a month and a half. R230:24. 
Defendant said that "the whole process would take about a month and a half 
5 
because it had to clear and everything/' Id. Defendant also agreed to pay the taxes 
and give Porter the cash. Id. Porter invested $3000 in mid-May 2006. R230:29. 
Porter invested money with Defendant three other times. R230:29. He 
invested $2500 with Defendant to buy silicone chips from one company and sell 
them to another. R230:30. In approximately June 2006, Defendant called Porter to 
tell him that his money was ready, but asked if Porter would like to roll it over and 
also invest another $2500. Id. Porter invested again. Id. Defendant then called 
asking for another $5000, but Porter could only come up with $1000. R230:32. 
Porter was uncertain about these individual amounts, but testified that he paid out a 
total of about $12,000. R230:42. 
Defendant repaid the money, with the interest, in approximately September 
2006. R230:34. 
Dealings with Steven Sandstrom. Defendant originally asked Steven 
Sandstrom to invest in truck parts, stuck in customs in Mexico, that, when released, 
would generate a large profit. R230:45. Sandstrom gave Defendant a check for 
$2500, but then stopped payment on the check. Id. 
In the fall of 2006, Defendant approached Sandstrom, saying that he had 
previously worked for Sun Microsystems and had some very favorable stock 
options, but was short on money to exercise them. R230:46. Defendant asked for 
$3000, which he promised to return with $240 in interest in two weeks. R230:47. 
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Sandstrom gave him the $3000. Id. A month later, Defendant asked for more 
money, saying that something had happened with the options. Id. Sandstrom 
wrote Defendant a check for $4000. R230:48. When he did not repay the money, 
Defendant gave Sandstrom a document stating that Defendant owed him $7,700, 
plus a late penalty, for a total of $9000. R230:49. A year and a half later, after 
Sandstrom"s lawyer wrote Defendant telling him that he would contact the Attorney 
General's Office unless he repaid the money, Sandstrom received $7,700, but no 
additional interest or late payment fee. R230:50. 
Dealings with Floyd Richey. Floyd Richey testified that Defendant first 
approached him about an investment in the early 2000's. R230:54. The investment 
offer "was about the microchips out of Ireland or somewhere/' Id. Richey did not 
invest at that time. Id. In late 2006 or 2007, Defendant again approached Richey first 
with a chip deal and then with a high-interest cash deal, but Richey declined both 
offers. R230:55-56. 
Investigation by Susan Jones. Susan Jones, an investigator with the Utah 
Division of Securities, investigated Defendant's transactions with the investors. 
R230:58. She testified that while Defendant told some investors that he had stock 
options in Intel and Sun Microsystems, affidavits from those companies stated they 
had no records of those options. R230:59-60. She also testified that while Defendant 
told some investors that he would repay them with the proceeds from a pending 
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medical malpractice suit, he did not tell them that the proceeds from that action, if 
any, were already committed. R230:59. 
Jones noted that some of the transactions involved promissory notes. R230:58. 
She testified that non-collateralized promissory notes are presumed to be securities, 
which should have been registered, but were not. R230:58-59, 62, 65. She also 
testified that Defendant was not licensed to sell securities, but failed to tell the 
investors that he was not licensed. R230:61-62. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The fine imposed by the Division of Securities was a civil sanction. A 
sanction is civil if the legislature intends that it be civil and if the effects of the 
sanction are not so punitive as to render it criminally punitive in the double 
jeopardy context. Only the "clearest proof" suffices to show that a sanction 
intended by the legislature to be civil is criminally punitive. 
Here, the legislature, by giving an administrative agency authority to impose 
a fine, indicated its intent that the sanction be civil. For the following reasons, the 
effects of the fine were not so punitive as to transform it into a criminal penalty: 
(1) monetary penalties have not historically been viewed as punishment; (2) a fine 
does not impose any affirmative disability or restraint comparable to imprisonment; 
(3) the fine comes into play without regard to a finding of scienter; (4) while the 
conduct for which the fine was imposed may also be criminal, that fact does not 
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render the fine criminally punitive; and (5) while the fine may deter others from 
similar conduct, deterrence may serve civil, as well as criminal, goals. 
Because the fine here was a civil sanction, Defendant's subsequent criminal 
punishment for securities violations was not a successive criminal punishment and 
did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE THE FINE IMPOSED BY THE DIVISION OF 
SECURITIES IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS WAS A 
CIVIL SANCTION, IT DID NOT BAR PROSECUTION AND 
PUNISHMENT OF DEFENDANT IN SUBSEQUENT CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant claims that his "conviction should be reversed because [the] 
prosecution was barred in this matter based on double jeopardy/' Br. Appellant at 
10 (boldface and capitalization omitted). He raises his claim under the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 10-16. He asserts that the fine 
imposed in his administrative case was "not solely civil in nature/' that it was a 
criminal penalty, and that the State was therefore "precluded by Double Jeopardy 
from once again pursuing criminal charges and penalties." Id. at 13-14 
(capitalization and underlining omitted). He further argues that "even if the 
legislature intended the remedy to be civil, it is punitive and triggers the protections 
of the Double Jeopardy Clause." Id. at 14 (boldface, capitalization, and underlining 
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omitted). However, under controlling law, the administrative fine was a civil 
penalty. Therefore, Defendant cannot prevail on his double jeopardy claim. 
Relevant law. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no "person [shall] 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." In 
Hudson v. United States, 511 U.S. 93 (1997), the United States Supreme Court noted 
that it has "long recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the 
imposition of all additional sanctions that could, '"in common parlance,"' be 
described as punishment." Id. at 98-99 (quoting United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 
317 U.S. 537,549 (1943), in turn quoting Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13,19,14 L.Ed. 306 
(1852)). Rather, "[t]he Clause protects only against the imposition of multiple 
criminal punishments for the same offense," id. at 99 (citing Helvering v. Mitcltell, 303 
U.S. 391, 399 (1938) (additional citations omitted) (emphasis in Hudson), and "then 
only when such occurs in successive proceedings," id. (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459 
U.S. 359, 366 (1983)). 
Hudson is the most recent United States Supreme Court case to focus on the 
double jeopardy implications of administrative sanctions and is controlling law in 
this case. The Hudson Court addressed monetary penalties and occupational 
debarment imposed by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) on bank 
officers for violating banking laws. See 522 U.S. at 93. In so doing, the Court 
outlined a two-prong test for determining "[wjhether a particular punishment is 
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criminal or civil." Id. at 99. First, a court must "ask whether the legislature, 'in 
establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a 
preference for one label or the other/" Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 
242,248 (1980)). Then," [e]ven in those cases where the legislature 'has indicated an 
intention to establish a civil penalty/" (quoting Ward, 588 U.S. at 248-49), a court 
must also ask, "'whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or 
effect' as to 'transform] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal 
penalty/" id. (quoting Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148,154 (1956)).l 
The Court further observed, "In making this latter determination, the factors 
listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,168-169 ... (1963), provide useful 
guideposts." Id. Those factors include: "(1) '[wjhether the sanction involves an 
1
 Hudson followed United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), which in turn 
followed Ward, 448 U.S. at 242. The Hudson court held "that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment is not a bar to the later criminal prosecution because 
the [prior] administrative proceedings were civil, not criminal." 522 U.S. at 95-96. 
But the Court stated that in so doing, it disavowed in large part "the method of 
analysis used in [Halper] and reaffirmed] the previously established rule 
exemplified in [Ward].f/ Id. at 96. 
Citation to Halper and authority relying on Halper should therefore be viewed 
with caution. State v. Arbon, 909 P.2d 1270 (Utah App. 1996), and State v. Mendoza, 
938 P.2d 303 (Utah App. 1997), referenced by Defendant in his brief, were decided 
when Halper was controlling authority, and therefore employ an analysis that is no 
longer wholly viable. 
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affirmative disability or restraint'; (2) 'whether it has historically been regarded as a 
punishment'; (3) 'whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter'; 
(4) 'whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment— 
retribution and deterrence'; (5) 'whether the behavior to which it applies is already a 
crime'; (6) 'whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected 
is assignable for it'; and (7) 'whether it appears excessive in relation to the 
alternative purpose assigned/" Id. at 99-100 (quoting Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69). 
But, the Court cautioned, "It is important to note ... that 'these factors must be 
considered in relation to the statute on its face/" id. at 100 (citing Kennedy, 372 U.S. 
at 169), and "'only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and 
transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty," id. 
(citing Ward, 448 U.S. at 249) (additional quotation marks omitted). 
The Hudson Court held that the monetary penalties and occupational 
debarment imposed by the OCC were civil sanctions. 522 U.S. at 105. The Court 
therefore concluded that criminal prosecution and punishment of the bank officers 
would not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause by imposing a successive criminal 
punishment. Id. 
In reaching this result, the Court first concluded, "It is evident that Congress 
intended the OCC money penalties and debarment sanctions imposed for violations 
of [relevant United States code sections] to be civil in nature." Id. at 103. The Court 
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reasoned that "[w]hile the provision authorizing debarment contains no language 
explicitly denominating the sanction as civil/7 it is "significant that the authority to 
issue debarment orders is conferred upon the appropriate Federal banking 
agenc[ies].77 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in 
Hudson). The Court stated, "That such authority was conferred upon administrative 
agencies is prima facie evidence that Congress intended to provide for a civil 
sanction/' Id. 
Turning to the second prong of the test, i.e., whether the effects of the money 
penalties or debarment sanctions were "so punitive in form and effect as to render 
them criminal despite Congress7 intent to the contrary/7 the Court found "little 
evidence, much less the clearest proof that we require/7 id. at 104, to "override 
Congress7 intent and transform what had been denominated a civil remedy into a 
criminal penalty/7 id. at 100 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 249). 
The Court explained: "First, neither money penalties nor debarment has 
historically been viewed as punishment/7 Id. at 104. "Second, the sanctions 
imposed do not involve an 'affirmative disability or restraint777 — "certainly nothing 
approaching the 'infamous punishment7 of imprisonment.77 Id. at 104 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). "Third, neither sanction comes into play 
'only7 on a finding of scienter/7 that is, money penalties are allowable "without 
regard to the violator's state of mind.77 Id. Fourth, while the conduct for which the 
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OCC sanctions are imposed may also be criminal, that fact "is insufficient to render 
the money penalties and debarment sanctions criminally punitive/7 Id. at 105. 
Finally, although the Court recognized that the imposition of monetary penalties 
and debarment sanctions would deter others from similar conduct— "a traditional 
goal of criminal punishment," the Court nevertheless concluded that "the mere 
presence of this purpose is insufficient to render a sanction criminal, as deterrence 
'may serve civil as well as criminal goals/" Id. (internal citations omitted). 
"In sum," the Court held, "there simply is very little showing, to say nothing 
of the 'clearest proof required ... that OCC money penalties and debarment 
sanctions are criminal." Id. As a result, the Double Jeopardy Clause constituted "no 
obstacle to [the bank officers'] trial on the pending indictments." Id. 
Analysis. Here, the sanctions imposed and their attendant circumstances are 
very similar to those in Hudson. The Utah Uniform Securities Act, Utah Code Ann. 
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§§ 61-1-1 to -30, establishes civil proceedings and sanctions for securities violations 
and also defines criminal offenses based on such violations.2 
Section 61-1-20 provides that "[w]henever it appears to the director [of the 
Division of Securities] that any person has engaged, is engaging, or is about to 
engage in an act or practice constituting a violation of this chapter or any rule or 
order under this chapter, in addition to any specific powers granted in this chapter 
... the director may issue an order directing the person to appear before the division 
and show cause why an order should not be issued directing the person to cease 
and desist/' Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-20 (West 2004). It also provides that "after a 
hearing, the director may issue an order to cease and desist from engaging in any 
act or practice constituting a violation/7 "impose a fine," or suspend that person 
from associating with a licensed broker-dealer or investment adviser in this state." 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-20(l)(e), (f), & (g). 
2
 Section 61-1-20 ("Enforcement") governs administrative proceedings and 
sanctions; section 61-1-21 ("Penalties for violations") defines criminal offenses. The 
separate provisions are similar to those in Hudson where Congress provided for civil 
proceedings and penalties for violations of banking laws in one title of the United 
States Code and defined criminal violations for violations of those laws in another. 
See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 96-97. 
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The legislature's authorization of administratively imposed sanctions 
demonstrates that those sanctions are civil in nature. As Hudson held, "That such 
authority was conferred upon administrative agencies is prima facie evidence that 
[the Utah legislature] intended to provide for a civil sanction." 522 U.S. at 103. 
Thus, the legislature, "in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either 
expressly or impliedly a preference" that a civil label be applied to the sanctions 
imposed by the Division of Securities. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). This satisfies the first prong of the Hudson test. 
The legislative scheme also meets the second prong of the Hudson test. The 
same factors that demonstrated that the administrative sanctions in Hudson were not 
so punitive in form and effect as to render those sanctions criminal are present in 
this case. First, as explained, the sanction here was a fine — a monetary penalty. As 
explained in Hudson, monetary penalties have not "historically been viewed as 
sanctions." Id. at 104. Second, neither the cease and desist order nor the fine 
imposed "an affirmative disability or restraint," "certainly nothing approaching the 
'infamous punishment' of imprisonment." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). Third, the administratively-imposed sanction did not "come[] into play 
'only' on a finding of scienter," that is, the fine was allowable "without regard to the 
violator's state of mind." Id. at 104; see also Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-20. By contrast, 
the statute defining criminal offenses for securities violations requires a "willful" 
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and/or "knowing" mental state. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21. Fourth, while the 
conduct for which the Securities Division sanctions are imposed may also be 
criminal, as was the conduct in Hudson, that fact "is insufficient to render the money 
penalt[y] ... criminally punitive/' Hudson, 522 U.S. at 105. Finally, while the fine 
imposed here may deter others from similar conduct— a traditional goal of criminal 
punishment—" the mere presence of this purpose is insufficient to render a sanction 
criminal, as deterrence 'may serve civil as well as criminal goals/" Id. (internal 
citations omitted). 
The two other Kennedy factors mentioned, but not discussed at length in 
Hudson, also support a conclusion that the fine here was more remedial than 
punitive. First, the $19,300 fine imposed was reducible "dollar for dollar for any 
money paid to the victims" within twelve days of the Division's order. R249. 
Moreover, if Defendant paid the full amount to the victims by that date, half of the 
remaining $5000 fine was waived. Id. Thus, there was "an alternative purpose to 
which [the fine] may rationally [have] be[en] connected," i.e., encouraging 
Defendant's repaying his victims in a timely manner. Hudson at 99 (quoting 
Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the fine was 
not "excessive in relation to the alternative purpose." Id. at 99-100 (quoting Kennedy, 
372 U.S. at 169) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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In sum, here, as in Hudson, application of the Kennedy factors demonstrates 
that the statutory scheme was not "so punitive either in purpose or effect" as to 
transform what the legislature "intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty/7 
Id. at 99 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Under controlling law, the 
sanctions imposed by the Division of Securities are thus civil sanctions, and the 
punishment imposed on Defendant following his criminal conviction was not a 
successive criminal punishment and did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted October <x£ , 2009. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
JEANNRB. INOUYE 
yssistamt Attorney General 
iounsal for Appellee 
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Addendum 
Addendum 
statement in writing, under oath or otherwise as to all the facts and circum-
stances concerning the matter to be investigated. 
(c) The division may publish information concerning any violation of this 
chapter or the violation of any rule or order hereunder. 
(2) For the purpose of any investigation or proceeding under this chapter, 
the division or any employee designated by it may: 
(a) administer oaths and affirmations; 
(b) subpoena witnesses and compel their attendance; 
(c) take evidence; and 
(d) require the production of any books, papers, correspondence, memo-
randa, agreements, or other documents or records relevant or material to the 
investigation. 
Laws 1963, c 145, § 1, Laws 1979, c. 218, § 6; Laws 1983, c. 284, § 28; Laws 1990, c. 
133, § 12 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Uniform Law Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA Data-
This section is similar to § 407 of the Uniform base on Westlaw 
Secunties Act (1956) See Volume 7C Uniform 
Cross References 
Perjury, falsification m official matters, see § 76-8-501 et seq 
Library References 
Securities Regulation C=»274 
Westlaw Key Number Search 349Bk274. 
C J S Securities Regulation §§ 413, 415 
§ 61—1-20. Enforcement 
Whenever it appears to the director that any person has engaged, is engaging, 
or is about to engage m any act or practice constituting a violation of this 
chapter or any rule or order under this chapter, in addition to any specific 
powers granted in this chapter: 
(l)(a) the director may issue an order directing the person to appear before 
the division and show cause why an order should not be issued directing the 
person to cease and desist from engaging in the act or practice, or doing any 
act in furtherance of the activity; 
(b) the order to show cause shall state the reasons for the order and the 
date of the hearing; 
(c) the director shall promptly serve a copy of the order io show cause 
upon each person named in the order; 
(d) the director shall hold a hearing on the order to show cause uo sooner 
than ten business days after the order is issued; 
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(e) after a hearing, the director may issue an order to cease and desict 
from engaging in any act or practice constituting a violation of this chapter 
or any rule or order under this chapter. The order shall be accompanied by 
written findings of fact and conclusions of law; 
(f) the director may impose a fine; and 
(g) the director may bar or suspend that person from associating with a 
licensed broker-dealer or investment adviser m this state. 
(2)(a) The director may bring an action in the appropriate district court of 
this state or the appropriate court of another state to enjoin the acts or 
practices and to enforce compliance with this chapter or any rule or order 
under this chapter; 
(b) upon a proper showing in an action brought under this section, the 
court may: 
(i) issue a permanent or temporary, prohibitory or mandatory injunc-
tion; 
(ii) issue a restraining order or writ of mandamus; 
(lii) enter a declaratory judgment; 
(iv) appoint a receiver or conservator for the defendant or the defen-
dant's assets; 
(v) order disgorgement; 
(vi) order rescission; 
(vii) impose a fine of not more than $500 for each violation of the act; 
and 
(viii) enter any other relief the court considers just; and 
(c) the court may not require the division to post a bond in an action 
brought under this subsection. 
Laws 1963, c 145, § 1; Laws 1983, c 284, § 29, Laws 1986, c 107, § 1, Laws 1990, c. 
133, § 13, Laws 1994, c. 12, § 70. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Uniform Law Laws Annotated, Master Edition or ULA Data-
This section is similar to § 408 of the Uniform base on Westlaw 
Securities Act (1956) See Volume 7C Uniform 
Cross References 
Complaint for declaratory judgment, see Rules Ci\ Proc , Form 8 
Complaint foi injunctive iebef see Rules Civ P roc , Form 9 
Declaratory judgments generally, see § 78-33-1 et seq 
Declaratory judgments, see Rules Civ Pioc , Rule 57 
Extraordinary writs, judicial code, see § 78-35-1 et seq 
Mandamus and prohibition, see § 78-35-9 
Receivers see Rules Civ Proc , Rule 66 
Westlaw Key Number Searches 349Bk274, 415 to 416, 418, 428 to 429. 
349BL277, 349BL291 
Notes of Dec i s ions 
Review 1 inapplicable statute when it issued suspension 
order was harmless error m that order was 
1 Review nevertheless statutorily authorized. U C A. 
'Upon determining that firm had unlawfully 1953, 61-1-7, 61-1-20 Capital General Corp. 
distributed shares of stock without registration, v U l a h Dept o f Business Regulation, Securities 
Utah Securities Advisory Board was authorized Div., 1989, 777 P 2d 494, certiorari denied 781 
to suspend all secondary trading exemptions of P 2d 878 Administrative Law And Procedure 
stock involved, Boards citation of technically o=»764 1, Securities Regulation @» 277 
§ 61 — 1 - 2 1 . Penalties for violations 
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony who willfully violates any 
provision of this chapter except Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-16, or wrho willfully 
violates any rule or order under this chapter, or who willfully violates Section 
61-1-16 knowing the statement made to be false or misleading in any material 
respect. 
(2) A person who willfully violates Section 61-1-1 : 
(a) is guilty of a third degree felony if, at the time the crime was commit-
ted, the property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be 
obtained was worth less than $10,000; 
(b) is guilty of a second degree felony if: 
(i) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing 
unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained wTas worth $10,000 or more; 
or 
(ii)(A) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or 
thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth less than 
$10,000; and 
(B) in connection with that violation, the violator knowingly accepted 
any money representing: 
(I) equity in a person's home; 
(II) a withdrawal from any individual retirement account; or 
(III) a withdrawal from any qualified retirement plan as defined in 
the Internal Revenue Code;1 or 
(c) is guilty of a second degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term of not less than three years or more than 15 years if: 
(i) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing 
unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth $10,000 or more; 
and 
di) in connection with that violation, the violator knowingly accepted 
any money representing: 
(A) equity in a person's home; 
(B) a withdrawal from any individual retirement account; or 
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Note 3 
(C) a withdrawal from any qualified retirement plan as defined in the 
Internal Revenue Code. 
(3) No person may be imprisoned for the violation of any rule or order if he 
proves that he had no knowledge of the rule or order. 
(4) In addition to any other penalty for a criminal violation of this chapter, 
the sentencing judge may impose any penalty or remedy provided for in 
Subsection 61-1-20(2)(b). 
Laws 1963, c 145, § 1; Laws 1971, c 155, § 1; Laws 1983, c 284, § 30; Laws 1990, c 
133, § H, Laws 1991, c 161, § 12; Laws 1992, c. 216, § 4, Laws 1997, c. 160, § 10, 
eff May 5, 1997; Laws 2001, c. 149, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001. 
i See 26 U S C A § 1 et seq 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Uniform Law Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA Data-
This section is similar to § 409 of the Uniform base on Westlaw 
Securities Act (1956) See Volume 7C Uniform 
Cross References 
Attempt, elements and classification, see §§ 76-4-101 and 76-4-102 
Conspiracy and solicitation, elements and penalties, see § 76-4-201 et seq 
Fines upon conviction of misdemeanor or felom, see § 76-3-301. 
Inchoate offenses, limitations on sentencing, see §§ 76-4-301 and 76-4-302 
Penalties for felonies, see § 76-3-203 
Right to trial by jur>, see Const Art 1, § 10. 
Library References 
Securities Regulation @»321. 
Westlaw Key Number Search. 349Bk321. 
C J S Securities Regulation §§ 445 to 446 
N o t e s of Dec is ions 
Construction and application 1 
Expert testimony 3 
Jury instructions 4 
Limitation of actions 2 
1. Construction and application 
Statute requiring that individual act "willful-
ly" to be criminally liable for securities fraud 
does not require "scienter," the intent to de-
ceive, manipulate or defraud U C A 1 9 5 3 , 
61-1-1(2), 61-1-21 State v Larsen, 1993, 865 
P 2d 1355 Securities Regulation C=> 323 
2. Limitation of actions 
Five-year statute of limitations set forth m 
Securities Act applied to defendant s crimmal 
prosecution for securities fraud, rather than 
four-year general felony limitation period 
U C A 1953,^61-1-21, 76-1-103(1), 76-1-302(1) 
3. Expert testimony 
Securities expert s use of word "material" 
during testimony was not improper instruction 
to jury on law m securities fraud prosecution; 
although statute under which defendant was 
prosecuted required finding that information 
not disclosed was 'mater ia l , " testimony when 
read m context seemed to use word 'material" 
as s\nonym for " impor tan t " U C.A 1953, 
61-1-1(2)," 61-1-21, Rules of Evid , Rule 702 
State v Larsen, 1993, 865 P 2d 1355 Criminal 
Law 0=> 469 3 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that expert testimony m securities 
fraud prosecution would be helpful to jury, 
where expert expressed opinion that some of 
material that defendant had omitted from secu-
rities documents could have been important or 
significant to investor, technical na ture of secu-
rities was not within knowledge of average lay-
